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An Empirical  Analysis
Alberto  R. Musalem
In 1985,  Mexico  shifted  to a growth  strategy  based  on private
investment  and exports  rather than  on import  substitution  and
public  sector  investment.  The policy  implications  of this  study
are that to increase  investment,  Mexico  should  follow  policies
aimed at reducing  investment  adjustment  costs and increasing
factor mobility and credibility in the program of structural
reforms  rather than at subsidizing  investment.
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Tmde, Flnum,  and hduWy
Mexico s past growth strategy - based on  To the extent that trade liberalization is not
import substitution and public sector investment  accompanied by policies that facilitate real
- proved unsustainable in the face of the  exchange rate depreciation, investment would be
financial crisis and the drop in oil prices.  More-  affested in two ways - first, profitability in the
over, with strong linkages between public and  tradeables sector would be reduced in the short
private investment, cutbacks in one forced  run, Increasing adjustment costs and impairing
cutbacks in the other. The result was a magni-  resource mobilization. Second, expectations of
fied cost of adjustment.  real depreciation will build up as economic
agentx anticipate that the long-run equilibrium
To resume sustainable growth, the Mexican  level of the real exchange rate consistent with
authorities adopted a new strategy whereby  impon liberalization is higher.  As a result,
private investment and exports rather than  destabilizing capital outflows may increase real
import substitution and public sector investment  interest rates and reduce confidence in the
would lead growth.  However, in the past,  govemment's ability to sustain trade policies.
investment responded extremely slowly to
changes in the incentive system. This behavior  As stabilization efforts continue, expecta-
may reflect high adjustment costs, uncertainties,  tions of inflation wiU  be reduced, increasing the
risks, and credibility problems induced by past  demand for money and therefore the real interest
macroeconomic instability.  Also, distortions in  rate.  As the government continues its policy of
the factor and goods markets may have impaired  relying less on the inflationary tax, however,
the mobility of resources.  Consequently,  favorable developments may follow:
structural reform began with the 1985 trade
reform, and was strengthened by the privatiza-  *  Financial deepening will reduce intermedia-
tion of public enterprises, economic deregula-  tion costs and spreads, increase access to finan-
tion, and tax and financial sector reforms.  cial services, and stimulate investment.
Further trade liberalization may be needed  * The unanticipated risk of capital losses on
- removal of the remaining quantitative restric-  holding domestic assets wiU  decline, thereby
tions, particularly on imports of used capital  increasing their liquidity and demand, and
goods - to encourage investment, both directly  reducing the real interest rate.
(through the price effect) and indirectly (as an
instnunent to promote trade and capacity  * The improved macromanagement will make
utilization).  relative prices less volatile, will reduce uncer-
tainties, risks, and adjustment costs, and wiU
increase the short-term investment response.
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Introduction
Mexico's  growth  rate  averaged  6.6Z  p.a.  between  1950  and  1974.
Between  1978  and  1982,  the  economy  grew  at  no less  than  an  average  of
8.72  p.a.;  while  between  1982  and  1987,  Mexico  did  not  grow  at all.
However,  during  the  1978-1982  period,  the  external  debt  tripled  from  US$29
to 86 billion. The  ratio  of external  debt  to GDP  jumped  from  28 to 521.
This  period  was brought  to a crashing  halt  during  the  mid-1982  debt  ctisis.
Lower  investment  on the  one  hand,  and  restrictive  demand  management  on the
other,  induced  no real  growth  between  1982  and  1988  and  hence  a severe
decline  in  per  capita  income.
The  analysis  of  Mexico  s  private  investment  explains  some  of the
country  economic  performance  and  its  determinants  are  examined  in this
paper. The  findings  suggest  that  investment  responded  extremely  slowly  to
changes  in  the  incentive  system  in  Mexico. This  result  suggests  that  the
adjustmient  costs  of changing  capital  to the  desired  stock  were relatively
high --possibly  due  to  high  uncertainties  and  risks,  and  credibility
problems  induced  by  macroeconomic  instability--  and  also,  that  distortions
in the  factor  and  goods  markets  impaired  the  mobility  of resources. The
policy  implications  of this  atudy  indicate  that  to iicrease  investment  and,
therefore  resume  growth,  Mexico  would  be better  off  with  policies  aimed  at
reducing  the  cost  of adjustment  on attaining  the  desired  capital  stock  and-2-
increasing  factor  mobility,  rather  than  providing  subsidies  to stimulate
investment.
This  analysis  also  demonstrates  that  investment  is  responsive  to
the  real  interest  rate,  the  relative  price  of investment  and  the  rate  of
capacity  utilization.  In addition,  the relative  price  of investment  is
determined  by the  price  of  new capital  equipment  in the  United  States.
Moreover,  the  real  interest  rate  in  Mexico  responds  to the  behavior  of the
real  lnterest  rate  in  the  United  States,  but  in the  short  run  it is also
affected  by expectations  of  movements  in the  real  exchange  rate,  the  rate
of domestic  credit  creation,  the  initial  ratio  of  money  to  capital,  the
unanticipated  inflationary  shocks  and  interest  rate  ceilings. A  simple
model  for  the  formation  of expectations  about  changes  in the  real  exchange
rate  indicated  that  a real  appreciation  of the  Mexican  peso in  the  previous
year induced  expectations  of  a real  depreciation  in the  current  year.
Also,  relaxation  of quantitative  restrictions  on imports  created
expectations  of a deterioration  in  the  trade  balance  and  a depreciation  of
the  Mexican  peso in  real  terms.
Economic  Background
The  outburst  of public  spending  in the  late  1970a,  the  subsequent
decline  in oil  prices  and  increases  in real  interest  rates  payable  on the
external  debt  caused  serious  public  finance  problems. These  problems  in
turn  triggered  an increase  in  inflation  not  previously  seen  in  Mexico's
economic  history. Since  high  and  variable  inflation  rates  go together  with
high relative  price  variability,  an  unpredictable  macroeconomic  environment
increases  uncertainties  and  risks  embodied  in investment  decisions,  thereby
rising  the  cost  of adjustments  and  reducing  investors'  responsiveness.- 3 -
The  fiscal  adjustment  after  1982  was  unavoidable  given  the  sudden
lack  of access  to international  capital  markets  and  the  series  of adverse
terms  of trade  shocks  that  took  place  over  the  period. As a  by-product,
the severe  fiscal  cutbacks  greatly  increased  public  sector  efficiency.  A
divestiture  program  was successful  in closing,  selling,  or transferring
roughly  two-thirds  of the  1155  public  enterprises  that  existed  in '.982.  In
addition,  few,  if  any,  of the  many  dubious  large  projects  of the  late
seventies  remain  in  the  public  sector  investment  program. Cutting  the
public  sector  investment  budget  from  almost  1O  of GDP in  1982  down  to  an
estimated  3.32  of  GDP in  1988  clearly  has  had its  costs;  government
investment  has a role  to  play in  areas  that  heavily  complement  private
investment  and  in the  social  sectors. Also,  private  investment  has  not
made  up for  the  decrease  in  public  investment.  Private  investment  is  now
aproximately  at its  pre-oil-boom  level  of 11-12Z  of  GDP (Figure  1).
Inflation,  rather  than  slowing  down,  accelerated  towards  the  end
of  the  period. The  de-facto  targeting  of the  real  exchange  rate  at a
relatively  high level  during  1986-1987,  together  with an increase  in the
frequency  of  wage and  cost  adjustments,  introduced  an element  of inherent
instability  into  the  system. This  later  became  fully  apparent  towards  the
end  of 1987.  The  temporary  opportunity  for  private  debt  buy-backs  evolving
from  the  1987  debt  rescheduling  together  with the  stock  market  plunge
triggered  a run  on the  peso.  This  resulted  in reserve  losses  and
eventually  a 37Z  depreciation,  fueling  inflation  and  expectations  of
further  exchange  rate  depreciations.  Mexico  responded  with the  Pacto  de
Solidaridad,  a concerted  effort  to  bring  down  inflation  which  had reached
triple  digits.FIGURE  1: MEXICO  - GROSS  PRIVATE  AND  PUBLIC  SECTOR
INVESTMENT  TO GDP  RATIOS
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(in  percent)The  Pacto  was  negotiated  in  December  1987  by representatives  from
the  Government,  labor,  farming,  and  industry. The  program  consisted  of
further  tightening  of fiscal  and  monetary  policy,  and  renewed  structural
reform  efforts. Trade  liberalization  was accelerated,  credit  subsidies
substantially  reduced,  and  the  progrsm  of public  enterprise  divestiture
reinforced.  These  measures  were supr  .;mcnted  by a freeze  on minimum  wages,
public  sector  prices  and  tariffs. A corner  stone  of the  Pacto  was pegging
the  exchange  rate  to the  U.S.  dollar. This  partial  freeze  was  originally
intended  to last  a couple  of  months  but  it  has  been  extended  at three  month
intervals  throughout  1988. At the  beginning  of 1989,  the  exchange  rate  was
set  at a  crawling  peg  at a rate  of  Mex$ 1  per  day.
On almost  every  target  that  is  under  direct  or indirect  control  of
the  government,  performance  under  the  Pacto  has  been  exemplary  and  often
has  gone  beyond  what  was initially  planned. Trade  reform  has  been
accelerated,  partly  because  of the  potential  efficiency  gains,  partly
because  of the  hope of restraining  the  effect  on price  increases. Total
governmental  expenditure,  net  of interest  payments,  has fallen  by about  ten
percentage  points  of GDP  over  the  past  few  years,  from  282  in 1982  down  to
an  estimated  182 in  1988.  The  fiscal  deficit  is  now  more in line  with the
low  inflation  targets  embedded  in  the  Pacto. This  effort  is  noteworthy
given  the  negative  budgetary  impact  of further  drops  in oil  prices  and
increasingly  high real  interest  rates  on the  foreign  debt  experienced
towards  the  end  of 198a.
Moreover,  this  has  been  achieved  in spite  of the  extremely  high
level  of domestic  real  interest  rates. These  have  been  at around  302  in- 6 -
real  terms  for  most  of 1988,  and  have  crept  up to a  compounded  real  rate  in
excess  of 40Z  towards  the  end  of 1988. All this  oecurred  while real
interest  rates  on government  debt  had  been  negative  (-3Z)  in  1987. With
the internal  debt  now at around  202  of  GDP, such  a turn  around  has resulted
in  a massive  increase  in real  interest  payments  to service  the  domestic
debt.  This  turn  around  explains  how a 2  percentage  point  improvement  in
the  non-interest  surplus  was  not  enough  to  prevent  a 5.1Z  deterioration  in
the  operational  deficit.
High  real  rates  probably  reflect  anticipations  of a resurgence  of
inflation  and  exchange  rate  devaluation.  Exchange  rate  uncertainty  has
forced  the  government  to run  very  restrictive  credit  polcies to  avoid
reserve  losses  given  the  fixed  exchange  rate. The real  exchange  rate  with
the  US appreciated  by 9.2Z  between  January  and  August  1988,  and  by 5.5?
since  March  of the  same  year,  the  first  month  with low  inflation. The  real
appreciation  of the  dollar  between  March  and  September  1988  has  added  to
the  pressure  (on  a trade-weighted  basis,  the  real  exchange  rate  has
appreciated  by 7.4Z  between  March  and  August). This  should  be set  against
a sharp  real  depreciation  of 42Z  on a trade-weighted  basis  between  July
1985  and  December  1987. July  1985  was the  month  preceding  a nominal
devaluation  of 17?  and  the  beginning  of a  much  more  aggressive  exchange
rate  policy. However,  falling  oil  prices  and  rising  foreign  interest  rates
in the  second  half of 1988  may  have  added  upward  pressure  on the  real
exchange  rate.  In addition,  the  significant  policy  of trade  liberalization
undertaken  in December  1987  has  also  contributed  to the  pressures  on the
real  exchange  rate,  as  will  be seen  below.-7-
It is clear  that  because  of short-term  problems,  fiscal  policy
cannot  be the  main engine  of growth,  and  balance  of  payments  considerations
leave  no option  but export-led  growth. However,  supply  bottlenecks  can  be
expected  to develop  in time,  with a consequent  need for  additional
investment.  At present,  gross  domestic  investment  stands  at  about  162  of
GDP,  its  lowest  historical  level. With fiscal  tightening  necessary  in  the
face  of low  inflation  targets  and  the  likely  negative  impact  of  external
shocks  on public  finance,  private  investment  will  have  to lead  the  way.
This is  also  more in line  with the  structural  reforms  currently  underway  in
Mexico;  these  reforms  seek  to reduce  rather  than  increase  the  role  of the
public  sector.
The  Model
The  model  assumes  that  Mexico  is  a price  taker  in  international
markets. That  is,  the  foreign  real  interest  rate  and  the  foreign  currency
denominated  prices  of tradeable  goods  are  given;  among  them,  the  price  of
new capital  equipment. Moreover,  Mexican  wealth-holders  can  decide  on the
composition  of their  portfolio  between  holdings  of three  assetst  domestic
real  assets  (a  composite  asset  including  installed  capital  goods  or equity
and  domestic  real  bonds  which  are  perfect  substitutes),  money  and  foreign
real  bonds  based  on  the  real  yield  of each  asset. The  model  assumes  that
domestic  assets  are  non-tradeable,  that  assets  are  gross  substitutes  and
that  the  monetary  authority  has a  passive  role  with respect  to  wealth-
holders'  decisions  of changing  their  portfolio  composition  between  domestic
and  foreign  assets  by allowing  accumulation  or de-accumulation  of foreign
reserves. In other  words,  the  nominal  exchange  rate  is  a policy
instrument. Therefore,  asset  demand  depends  on rates  of return  and  wealth:(1)  m  - M/P  - a*  r,  rf +  De@, (-DP/P))v 
(2)  p,(r)  x  - (Pk K/P)  +  (C|r  P) - k  +  b -a  (  r, rf +  Dee, (-DP/P)g )v
(3)  f  - (E  F/rf  P) - af (  r, rf  +  Dee, (-DP/P)O  )  v
where  r is the  real  interest  rate  on domestic  real  assets  Cx)  rf  +  Deg  is
the real  expected  return  on foreign  real  bonds  (f),  since  rf is the  real
interest  rate  and  Dee  is the  expected  rate  of change  in the  real  exchange
rate;  (-DPIP)O  is  the  expected  rate  of inflation  (the  negative  yield  of
real  money,  a); Pk is the  market  price  of capital;  K  is the  number  of  units
of capital;  P is  the  price  level;  B is the  number  of  units  of domestic  real
bonds  yielding  a  constant  value  Mexican  peso  at perpetuity;  px is  the
market  price  of the  composite  domestic  real  asset,  which  is inversely
related  with the  real  interest  rate;  E is the  nominal  exchange  rate  defined
in units  of  Mexican  pesos  per  US dollar;  and  F is the  number  of  units  of
foreign  real  bonds  yielding  a  constant  value  US dollar  at perpetuity.
Finally,  real  wealth  (w)  equals  the  real  value  of asset  holdings:
(4)  v - m  + pxCr)  x + f
The  system  (l)-04)  boils  down  to  only  one  equilibrium  condition,  the
domestic  real  asset  market  condition,  s, since  we assume  that:  the  nominal
exchange  rate (E),  the  US real  interest  rate 'rf),  the  expected  rate  of
change  in the  real  exchange  rate  (Dee),  and  the  rate  of expected  inflation
((DP/P)e),  are  exogenous. Equation  1 and  3  collapsed  into  one  based  on the
assumption  on  monetary  policy,  and  due  to  Walras'  Law  can  be ignored.- 9  -
Equation  2  will determine  the  equilibrium  real  intwoost  rate. The
assumption  that  domestic  real  bonds  and  capital  are  perfect  substitutes
implies  that  the  price  of capital  relative  to the  price  of real  bonds  is
nearly  constant.  However,  the  rate  of return  on capital  may  be different
than  the  real  interest  rate  on dometic financial  assets  due  to  a constant
risk  and  liquidity  premiums. The  analysis  will first  study  investment  and
then  the  determination  of the  real  interest  rate.
Private  Investment
Gross  fixed  private  investment  in  Mexico  fluctuated  between  10.5  and
16.5Z  of GDP from  1960  to 1987  (Figure  1). A model  of gross  fixed  private
investment  incorporates  three  effects:  (i)  the  replacement  of depreciation;
(ii)  the  adjustment  of the  actual  level  of the  capital  stock  to  the  desired
level;  and (iii)  the  capacity  utilization  of the  actual  capital  stock. A
low  rate  of capacity  utilization  will render  much  of the  existing  capital
stock  redundant,  hence  lowering  investment.  The  proxy  variable  used  for
capacity  utilization  is  the  output-capital  ratio.  Thus,
PRIVt  - d  kt-1  +  vo (k*t  - kt-1)  +  vl (Y/K)t
(5)  PRIVt  - (d-vo)  kt.I  +  vo k*t  +  vl (Y/K)t
where:
PRIV  is  the  annual  rate  of  gross  fixed  private  investment  in
billions  of  Mex$ at 1980  prices;
kt-l  is the  stock  of capital  at the  beginning  of the  year in
billions  of  Mex$ at 1980  prices;
d  is the  annual  rate  of depreciation  of the  capital  stock
(d  >  0);
vO  is the  coefficient  of adjustment  of the  desired  capital
stock  (vo  >  0);
vi  is the  coefficient  of investment  response  to  the  rate  of
capacity  utilization  of the  actual  capital  stock  (vl  >  0);- 10  -
(Y/K)  is  the  ratio  of  output  to capit.',l  stock  lagged  one  year,
as  a percentage;  and
k*  is the  desired  capital  stock.
The  desired  capital  stock  is derived  from  the  long  run  equilibrium
condition  where  the  value  marginal  product  of  capital  (VMPk)  is  equal  to
the rental  cost  of  capital. We assume  that  the  production  function  is
linearly  homogeneous  in labor  and  capital. Thus,
(6)  VMPk  - MPk (  K, L, PUI,  t )  P  (r+d)  PI;  and  HPkk,  MPLL <  0*
Hence,
(7)  K* -K*  (r, p, PUI,  L, t,  d)
where  MPk is  the  marginal  product  of capital;  L stands  for  labor;  PUI  is
the  public  sector  investment;  p is the  relative  price  of investment  (PI/P);
and  t stands  for  the  unincorporated  technological  change.
An increase  in the  real  interest  rate  on domestic  real  assets  or
in the  relative  price  of investment  will require  an increase  in the  MPk  to
maintain  the  equilibrium  condition  of  Equation  6.  This  can  be attained  by
a decline  in the  desired  capital-labor  ratio,  which  for  a given  quantity  of
labor,  will be obtained  through  a fall  in the  desired  stock  of capital.
Moreover,  public  sector  investment  is seen  as affecting  private
sector  investment.  Public  investment  in infrastructure  could  increase  the
MPk if they  are  complementary.  However,  in  Mexico  a restrictive  regulatory- 11  -
framework  which  has linked  private  sector  production  to  public  enterprise
(PE)  activities  in  both  the  goods  and  factor  markets  hi.s  prevailed. As a
result  public  sector  investments  have  become  a  determining  factor  in
private  sector  investment,  far  exceeding  the  usual  complementarity  between
public  infrastructure  and  private  undertakings.  More specifically,  an
expansion  in  the  PEs'  capacity  to produce  industrial  inputs  (e.g.,  basic
petrochemical  can  only  be produced  by PEMEX)  was a  precondition  for  the
complementary  private  sector  'ownstream  investments  (e.g.,  secondary  and
tertiary  petrochemicals).  Conversely,  an increase  in  PEa' demand  resulting
from  capacity  expansion  has fostered  some  private  sector  investment
undertaken  for  the  purpose  of satisfying  this  additional  demand  (e.g.,
capital  goods  sector  expansion  to satisfy  PEMEX's  and  other  PEs  demand).
Moreover,  this  complementary  relationship  may  have  been  encouraged  through
the  granting  of selective  incentives  for  directing  private  investment  to
fulfill  the  desired  policy  goals. Figure  1 shows  a predominantly  positive
relationship  between  public  and  private  investment  as shares  of GDP.
However,  the  relationship  between  both  variables  seems  to  have changed
after  1982.
Accordingly,  the  equation  for  the  desired  capital  stock  and  the
gross  fixed  private  investment  can  be  written  as:
(8) k* - ko +  kl r  + k2 P +  k3 PUI ,  and
(9) PRIVt-  voko  +  vok, rt  + vOk 2 Pt +  vOk 3 PUIt  +  vl (Y/K)t  +  (d-vo)  kt1.l
where:  ko incorporate  the  effects  of  L, t and  d on the  desired  capital
stock,  discussed  in  Equation  7;  kl,  k2 <  0 ;  and  (complements)  0 < k3  0  O
(substitutes).  In addition,- 12 -
r  is  the  ex-Dost after  tax  average  real  interest  rate  on
banking  instruments,  as  a  percentage;
p  is  a  relative  price  index  as a  percentage,  defined  as the
ratio  between  the  gross  investment  implicit  price  deflator
and  the  GDP  deflator;  and
PUI  is the  public  sector  gross  fixed  investment  in billions  of
MHeS at 1980  prices.
A  simple  OLS  estimate  of Equation  9 for  private  investment  on an
annual  basis  during  the  period  1962-1987,  yields  the  following  resultas
(10) PRIVt  - -339  - 2.87  rt1l  - 2.3  Pt  +  .6  PUlt  +  12.4 (Y/K)t  + .036  kt-1
(-1.3) (-2.1)  (-1.8)  (5.7)  (3.5)  (5.6)
R2 ; 96.3Z  R2 . 95.1?  DV - 2.07  RHO  - .04  (.86)  F  -81.4
w,here  the  values  in  parenthesis  correspond  to the  t-statistics.
The  results  indicate  that:  (i)  the  capital  replacement  effect
dominated  the stock  adjustment  effect,  the  latter  being  too  small
(possibly,  no higher  than  22  p.a.);l  (ii)  public  sector  investment  strongly
complemented  private  investment;  (iii)  private  investment  was negatively
related  to the  relative  price  of investment;  (iv)  private  investment
responded  negatively  to the  one-year  lagged  real  interest  rate,  possibly
1I  From  the  Equation  9,  the  coefficient  of the  lagged  capital  stock  is
equal  to d-vo. The  estimated  value  of this  coefficient  is 3.6Z.
Hence,  an overall  rate  of depreciation  of 5.62  (higher  than  that
reported  in the  National  Accounts)  will  be needed  to obtain  a
coefficient  of adjustment  of 2Z  p.a.- 13  -
because  investors  form  their  expectations  on  the real  interest  rate  based
on its  level  of the  previous  year;  and (v)  private  investment  was
positively  related  to  capacity  utilization.
Table  1 shows  the  short-  and  long-run  effects  on  private
investment  due  to changes  in  the  level  of its  determinants,  assuming  that
the  adjustment  coefficient  is 2Z  p.a.  This  small  value  may imply
relatively  high  adjustment  costs,  thus  resulting  in large  differences
between  short  and long  term  effects. In fact,  the  high  cost  of adjustment
may  be a  reflection  of the  relative  instability  of the  macroeconomic
environment  that  characterized  the  period  under  study. This  may  have
increased  the  uncertainties  and  the  risks  of investment  decisions,  thereby,
fostering  an extremely  cautious  response  of  Mexican  investors.  Moreover,
the  small  coefficient  of adjustment  may  also reflect  imperfections  and
immobilities  in the  goods  and  factor  markets,  as  well as,  problems  of
credibility  in  the  structural  reforms  adopted  in  the  past.
Table  1.  MEXICO:  Short-  and  Long-Run  Effects  on Private  Investment
(Billions  of  1980  Mex$)
Short-Run  Long-Run
Increase  of one  percentage  poiit  in r  -2.87  -143.5
Increase  of one  percentage  point  in  p  -2.3  -115.5
Increase  of 1 billion  in  PUI  .6  30.0
Increase  of one  percentage  point  in  Y/K  12.4  620.0- 14  -
These  results  suggest  that  the  greatest  stimulus  to  private
investment  will come  from  policies  directed  at reducing  the  cost  of
adjustment,  and  increasing  factor  mobility  and  credibility  on the  ongoing
policies  of structural  reform. That  is,  improved  macromanagement  inducing
greater  stability  in the  real  exchange  rate,  real  interest  rate,  and
relative  prices  in  general  should  provide  a supportive  macroenvironment  for
a faster  investment  response. Also a review  of the  regulatory  framework
and  policies,  aimed  at improving  competition  and  mobility  in the  goods  and
factor  markets  should  improve  credibility  and  the  opportunities  for  a
quicker  adjustment  in response  to  changes  in the  system  of economic
incentives.
To confirm  the  slow  adjustment  result,  however,  further  research
would still  be needed. At this  time,  our  analysis  continue  studying
investment  behavior  by estimating  equations  for  the  relative  price  of
investment  and  the  real  interest  rate.
The  Relative  Price  of Investment
Since  the  price  of investment  includes  new  capital  equipment  which
is a tradeable,  these  prices  reflect  those  in the  United  States. Also,
changes  in  QRs on total  imports  may  have affected  domestic  prices  of  new
capital  goods  to the  extent  that  QRs  on  new capital  goods  also  changed.
Moreover,  an improved  net  foreign  asset  position  may  have facilitated
import  licensing  approvals,  in  particular,  those  of  new  capital  goods.
Consequently,  the  relative  price  of investment  may  be negatively  related  to
the  level  of  net foreign  assets. Finally,  there  is a lagged  response  in
actual  prices  (p)  to the  equilibrium  prices  (p-),  thus:- 15 -
(11)  Pt  - Pt-i  +  (Pt - Pt-I)
Pt  - (1-z)  Pt-i  +  AP-t. and
(12)  P-t  - bo + blpft  +  b2 QRt  +  b3 at  hence
(13)  Pt  - zbo + :blpft  +  ab2 Qlt  +  0b 3 at  + (1-a)  Pt-I
where:  bl,  b2 > O  and b3 < O;
pf  is the  domestic  currency  price  of the  U.S.  producer  price
for  capital  equipmaet  relative  to  Mexican  GDP  deflator,  as a
perccntage  (i.e.,  the  real  exchange  rate  for  capital  goods);
QR  is an index  of quantity  restrictions  on imports  an a
percentage;  and
a  is  net  foreign  assets  of  the  consolidated  banking  systes  in
billions  of  1980  Mez$.
The  OLS estimate  of  Zquation  13  for  the  behavior  of  the  relative
price  of  investment  on  an  annual  basis  during  the  period  1962-1987  yields
the  following  results:
(14)  Pt  - 20.0  +  .19  pft  +  .104  QRt  - .024  at  +  .50  Pt-i
(1.19) (3.1)  (1.29)  (-2.8)  (3.8)
2 .81.92  2  - 78.4Z  Durbin  h - -. 12  7  - 23.7
where  the  values  in  parenthesis  correspond  to the  t-statistics.
The  results  indicate  that:  (i)  there  is  a lagged  response  of
actual  prices  to the  equilibrium  level;  (ii)  the  domestic  price  of
investment  is related  to the  behavior  (3f  the  real  exchange  rate  for  new
capital  equipment;  (iii)  quantity  restrictions  on total  imports  are
marginally  binding;  and (iv)  the  level  of  net foreign  assets  is  negatively
related  to the  relative  price  of investment,  indicating  that  licensing  of
imports  of  new capital  goods  depended  on the  level  of net  foreign  reserves.
Table  2  shows  the  short  and  long-run  effects  of  changes  in  the
level  of  the  explanatory  variables  on  the  relative  price  of  investment.- 1  -
Table  2.  MXXISC0  Short-  and  Long-Run  lifects  on the  Relative
Price  of  Znvestment
(in  Percentage  Points)
Short-Run  Long-Run
Increase  of one  percentage  point  in  pf  .19  .36
Increase  of one  percentage  point  in  QRs  .104  .21
Increase  of I  billion  1980  Mex$ in  a  -.024  -.05
Figure  2 indicates  that  the  rolative  price  indez  of investment  in
Mexico  has  always  been  below  the  U.S. relative  price  of new  capital  goods
in  Mexican  pesos. This  explains  that  capital  equipment  is indeed  a
component  in the  implicit  cost  of investment,  albeit  an important  one.
Accordingly,  a  possible  incentive  for  investment  could  come  by further
liberalizing  trade  policy,  that  is  to reduce  the  cost  of a  major  component,
namely,  capital  equipment.  Although  QRs  for  new  capital  goods  have  been
abolished,  QRs  still  remain  for  used  capital  goods. Moreover,  Rule  8 of
the  Tariff  Code  allows  imports  of  parts  for  assembling  new capital  goods
with ad valorem  tariffs  ranging  from  0 to lOS,  instead  of the  simple
average  nominal  tariff  on imports  of  new capital  goods  of 13.5Z  (12.6Z
weighted). To improve  efficiency  in  the  allocation  of resources,  a  more
neutral  tariff  treatment  for  imports  of new  capital  goods  would  be
desirable.
On the  other  hand,  imports  of used  durable  goods  (e.g.  used
capital  goods)  under  Rule  10 are  subject  to the  same  tariffs  as imports  of
new capital  goods,  but  with a depreciation  schedule  that  discriminates
against  imports  of  used  capital  goods. A more realistic  depreciation
schedule  for  imports  of  used  capital  goods  would  provide  Mexican  investors
with access  to cheaper  capital  goods,  and  possibly  with a  wider  variety  of- 17  -
FIGURE  2: MEXICO  - RELATIVE  PRICE  OF  NEW  CAPITAL  GOODS
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incorporated  technology.  Mexico  has  not  had  a good  experience  with imports
of used  capital  goods  in the  past.  This  was due,  in  part,  to the  fact  that
a  non-competitive  and  protected  market  offered  opportunities  for  imports  of
obsolete  capital  goods. However,  under  present  more competitive  markets,
there  is little  room  left  for  imports  of capital  goods  that  are  inefficient
to operate  in  competitive  foreign  markets.
The  Real Interest  Rate
As assumed  above,  Mexican  wealth-holders,  besides  having  to decide
between  holding  the  composite  asset  integrated  by domestic  real  financial
assets  and  productive  capital,  also  have the  opportunity  to  hold foreign
real  bonds. The  last  possibility  creates  the  linkage  between  domestic  and
foreign  real  interest  rates. Figure  3 shows  that  there  was a close
relationship  between  the real  interest  rate  in  Mexico  and  that  of the
United  States  up until  the  mid- 19709. However,  since  1976,  Mexico's  real
interest  rate  has  been systematically  negative  and  significantly  smaller
than  the  one  in the  United  States. Hence,  there  are  other  factors  that
have  played  a eole  in the  determination  of the  real  interest  rate  in
Mexico.
The  arbitrage  process  will also  take  into  account  macroeconomic
conditions;  in  particular,  expectations  of changes  in the  real  exchange
rate.  Thus  expectation  of a real  appreciation  of the  Mexican  peso  will
increase  the  expected  income  stream  of  domestic  real  assets  in  terms  of
foreign  currency;  hence,  increasing  the  demand  for  Mexican  real  assets  in
general  and,  thereby,  reducing  the  real  interest  rate.- 19  -
The  policy  of interest  rate  controls  has  had some  responsability
for  the  outcome  of  negative  real  interest  rates  in the  face  of accelerating
inflation  (Figure  4). Moreover,  changes  in the  rate  of domestic  credit
creation  induce  flow  disoquilibium  in the  asset  markets  and  changes  in the
expectations  of inflation  thus  fostering  a  portfolio  shift  between  money
and  real  assets  and  changes  in  the  domestic  real  interest  rate. Also,
unanticipated  inflationary  shocks  such  as those  that  have taken  place  since
1982,  have  helped  generate  negative  ex-post  real  interest  rates.
Ultimately,  the  level  of equilibrium  of the  donestic  real  interest
rate  will result  when all  asset  markets  clear. Therefore,  wealth  holders'
decisions  on the  composition  of their  portfolio  will affect  the  equilibrium
real  interest  rate. The  ratio  of  money  to the  composite  domestic  real
asset  will  be a  key  variable  in the  determination  of the  real  interest
rate. Accordingly,  a higher  initial  ratio  of  money  to real  domestic  assets
creates  an excess  supply  of  money  and  an excess  demand  for  real  domestic
assets,  which can  only  be resolved  by an increase  in  the  composite  price  of
the  real  domestic  assets,  that  is,  a decline  in the  real  interest  rate.
Consequently,  the  equation  for  the  real  interest  rate  is  written
ass
15)  rt  m go +  g1 rft  + 92  Deet  +  g3 ct + g 4 (M/K)t_j  + g5 du
where:  g1, g2  >  0  and  g3,  g4,  g5 <  0;
rf  is the  ex-post  real  interest  rate  on  U.S.  Federal  Funds
as a percentage;
Dee  is  the  expected  annual  rate  of change  in the  real
exchange  rate  as a  percentage  (Dee  >  0 means  a expected
real  depreciation  of the  Hexican  peso).  D is the  first-
difference  operator  and  e is  the  log  of the  real
exchange  rate;- 20 -
c  is  the  annual  rate  of chtnge  in  domestic  credit  creation
as a  percentage;
(M/K)t-l in  the  ratio  of the  stock  of  money  and  quasi-money  to
the stock  of  capital  as a  percentage  measured  at the
beginning  of the  year.  This  variable  is  a proxy  for  the
more  appropiate  ratio  of  money  to real  domestic  assets
discussed  above;  and
du  is a  dummy  variable  to  capture  the  unanticipated
inflationary  shocks  experienced  since  1982. It adopts  a
zero  value  for  each  of  the  previous  years,  and  a unit
value  for  1982  and  thereafter.
To complete  the  analysis,  we need  to specify  a  model  for  the
formation  of expectations  of  changes  in the  real  exchange  rate. We first
postulate  that  the  expected  real  exchange  rate  in  year  t is a  weighted
average  of the  actual  real  exchange  rate  in  the  previous  two  years  and  a
function  of the  contemporaneous  structural  policies  affecting  the  trade
balance,  in  particular,  trade  policy. Due to  the  availability  of data,  the
only  trade  policy  variable  that  will  be considered  is the  degree  of
quantitative  restrictions  on imports. Thus,  an increase  in  QRs  will induce
expectations  of an immediate  improvement  in  the  trade  balance,  hence  an
appreciation  of the  Mexican  peso  in real  terms. Accordingly,  the  equation
for  expectations  of the  real  exchange  rate  can  be expressed  as follows:
16)  eet  - (1-ho)  et-1  +  ho et-2  +  hl QRt
wheres:  0 <  ho < 1  and  hl < 0.  Hence,  the  expectation  of changes  in the
real  exchange  rate  becomest
17)  Deet  - et - et_l  - -ho  (et-l  - et-2)  + h, QR - -ho  Deti,  + h, QRt
That  is,  an appreciation  in  the  Mexican  peso in  real  terms  in the  previous
year  generates  expectations  of a depreciation  in  the  current  year.
Replacing  the  results  of  Equation  (17)  into (15),  we can  finally  express
the  equation  for  the  real  interest  rate  as:- 21  -





-25  ,,,  W I,,,  . I,  . I  *  |  . .
1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985- 22  -
FIGURE  4: MEXICO  - NOMINAL  INTEREST  RATE  AND  INFLATION
(annual,  in  percent)
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18)  rt - 50  +  51  rft - * 2ho Det-1  +  g 2hl Q1t +  83 Ct  +  54 (MIX)t-l  +  gs du
The OLS estimate  of Equation  18  for the  annual  real  interest  rate
for  the period  1963-1987  yields  the following  results:
19) rt  - 23.5  +  .76  rft  - .13  Det-l - .26  QRt - .12  Ct  - .58  (MZ')t-.  - 11 du
(11)  (5)  (-3.1)  (-8.8)  (-6.2)  (-3)  (-5.6)
R2 * 94.52  R2 - 92.32  DV - 2.03  RHO . -.13 (-.52)  F . 41.9
where  the  values in  parenthesis  correspond  to the  t-statistics.
The results  accept  the  hypothesis  that  the  real  interest  rate  in
Mexico  is  proportionally  adjusted  to changes  in the  US real  interest  rate.
This  result  suggests  that  domestic  and  U.S. real  bonds  are  close
substitutes. Moreover,  the  real  interest  rate  incorporates  expectations  of
changes  in the real  exchange  rate.  The  model accepts  that  both,  a real
appreciation  of the  Mexican  peso in  the  previous  year  and  a  contemporaneous
policy  of trade  liberalization  induce  expectations  of a real  depreciation
in  the current  year.  This  will foster  a change  in  portfolio  composition
favoring  holdings  of foreign  real  assets  at the  expense  of domestic  real
and  monetary  assets,  therefore,  increasing  Mexico's  real  interest  rate.
These results  may provide  some  of the  explanation  for  the  high level  of the
real  interest  rate  during  1988  and 1989.  However,  these  are some  of the
reasons  for  generating  a differential  between  the  domestic  and foreign  real
interest  rates.
In  addition,  the level  of the  Mexican  real interest  rate  responds
to conditions  in domestic  asset  markets.  In  particular,  a  high initial
ratio  of cash  balances  to  capital  creates  an excess  supply  of  mon2y and  an
excess  demand  for  domestic  real  assets. Equilibrium  will be restored
through  capital  flight  and an increase  in the  price  of real  assets  --  i.e.,- 24 -
a fall  in  the  real  interest  rate. Moreover,  an  acceleration  in  the  rate  of
domestic  credit  creation  will  create  a flow  excess supply  of  money  and
excess  demand  for  real  assets  --  the  liquidity  effect.  This  effect  will  be
reinforced  by a  fall  in  the  demand  for  money  due  to  expectations  of  rising
inflation  ttemming  from  the  acceleration  in  the  rate  of  credit  e*pansion,
which,  in  turn,  induces  a  fall  in  the  desired  ratio  of  money  to real  assets
in  wealth  holders'  portfolios.  Ultimately,  equilibrium  will  be restored
through  capital  flight  and  a  fall  in  the  real  interest  rate. However,  this
model  is  a short  run  model  of  real  interest  rate  determination.  In  the
long  run,  the  real  interest  rate  cannot  be  affected  by  monetary  policy,  it
will  have  to  reflect  either  consumers'  rate  of  time  preference,  or  the
level  of foreign  real-interest  rates,  which  are  independent  of monetary
variables.
Finally,  estimates  confirm  that  unanticipated  inflationary  shocks
have  negatively  affected  the  ez-post  real  interest  rate.  The caDital
losses  that  this  implies,  in  turn,  may have  forced  a  significant  increase
in  the  ex-ante  real  interest  rate  to  cover  for  the  higher  risk  of  holdings
of  domestic  financial  assets.
Concluding  Remarks
Mexico's  past  growth  strategy  based  on  import  substitution  and
public  sector  investment  proved  to  be  unsustainable  as  expansionary  fiscal
policies  came to  an  end  with  the  financial  crisis  and  drop  in  oil  prices  in
the  19809.  Moreover,  complementary  liriks  between  public  and  private
investment,  necessarily  implied  that  the  cutbacks  in  the  former  also  forced
contraction  in  the  latter.  The  result  was  a  magnified  cost  of  adjustment,
particularly  where  linkages  were  high  (e.g.,  capital  goods).- 25 -
To resume  sustainable  growth,  the  Hexican  authorities  adopted  a
now strategy  whereby  expansion  in  aggregate  demand  would  have to  come
primarily  from  exports  rather  than  from  import  substitution  and  fiscal
deficits. Accordingly,  the structural  reform  process  began  with the  trade
reforms  in  1985.  Table  1 shows  that  the  greatest  effect  on investment
corresponds  to the  rate  of capacity  utilization.  At present,  there  is  no
other  sustainable  source  for  increased  capacity  utilization  than  through
increasing  non-oil  exports. Also,  the  trade  reform  has reduced  distortions
in the  price  of capital  goods,  thereby  stimulating  investment.
However,  to the  extent  that  trade  liberalization  is  not
accompanied  by a supportive  macroeconomic  environment,  particularly  by an
improvement  in the  Government  budget  or a simultaneous  devaluation  in the
Hexican  peso  to  offset  the  deteriorating  balance  of trade  effect  stemming
from  the  trade  liberalization  policies,  expectations  of depreciation  of the
Mexican  peso in  real  terms  will develop. This,  in turn,  will induce  a
portfolio  shift  against  holdings  of domestic  assets  in  favor  of foreign
assets,  thereby  increasing  the  real  interest  rate. Accordingly,  investment
may  be discouraged,  a consequence  of an ill  fated  trade  liberalization
policy  due  to a lack  of consistent  macroeconomic  policies.
Further  trade  liberalization  measures  may still  be needed,
especially  the  removal  of the  remaining  QRs,  in  particular,  those  on
imports  of used  capital  goods. This  would  encourage  investment,  both
directly  through  the  price  effect,  and indirectly  as an instrument  to
promote  trade. To obtain  these  benefits,  it  is  necessary  to review  Rule  10
of the  Tariff  Code  on the  method  for  assessing  the  value  of  used durable
goods,  and replace  it  with a  market  determined  system  of depreciation.- 26 -
As  the  stabilization  efforts  continue,  the  rate  of domestic  credit
creation  should  be reduced. This  policy,  as in  the  past,  may induce  a
reduction  in  the  expectations  of inflation.  This,  in turn,  could  increase
the  ratio  of  money  to real  assets  in  wealth  holders'  portfolios,  thereby
increasing  the  real  interest  rate  thus  discouraging  investment.  However,
this is  a short  run  effect  since  monetary  policy  cannot  change  the  long  run
real  interest  rate. As the  Government  continues  its  policy  of reducing
reliance  on the  inflationary  tax  as a  source  of finance,  more important  and
favorable  developments  will occur. First,  financial  deepening  will reduce
intermediation  costs  and  spreads  and  increase  access  to financial  services
and  thereby  stimulate  investment.  This  effect  is  being  strengthened  by the
ongoing  economic  deregulation  in  the financial  sector. Second,  the
unanticipated  risk  of capital  losses  on  holding  domestic  assets  will
decline,  thereby,  increasing  their  liquidity  and  demand  and  reducing  the
real  interest  rate. Third,  incentives  for  managing  the  exchange  rate  to
repress  inflationary  pressures  (thus  inducing  appreciation  of the  Mexican
peso in real  terms  and  expectations  of  depreciation  and  a  higher  real
interest  rate)  will greatly  be reduced. But  more important  of all,
improved  macromanagement  will reduce  the  volatility  in relative  prices  in
general  and  therefore  uncertainties,  risks  and  adjustment  costs,  and  will
increase  credibility  and  the  short  run  response  of investment  to the  gap
between  the  desired  and  actual  stocks  of capital.
In addition,  the  Government  has  recognized  the  need for  reforming
the  regulatory  framework  in  order  to foster  a  more  competitive  market
structure  and  to unleash  private  sector  decision  making  from  public  sector
performance.  These  reforms  are  expanding  private  sector  opportunities  to- 27 _
new  areas  of activities  while improving  factor  mobility  and the  supply
response  to the  change  in  the  incentive  system,  hence  stimulating  private
investment.
Data
The definition  and  sources  of the  data  used in  the estimates  are
discussed  below  while the  data is  shown  in  Table  3.
Real  Money  and Quasi-Honey. It is defined  as  the  aggregate  of
money and  quasi-money  of the  consolidated  banking  system  deflated  by  the
GDP deflator.  The source  was the  monetary  survey  in IFS,  IMF.
Net Foreign  Assets.  It is  defined  as  net international  reserves
of the  consolidated  banking  system  less  long-term  foreign  liabilities  and
deflated  by the GDP  deflator. The source  was  the  monetary  survey  in  IFS,
IF, Yearbook,  1987  and  August  1988.
Capital  Stock  The  data  was  obtained  from  a  survey  done  by  the
Bank  of  Mexico for  the  period  1960-1985.  Villalpando  Hernandez.  L.H.  and
Fernandez  Moran, J., "La  Rncuerta  de  Acervos,  Depreciacion  y  Formacion  de
Capital  del  Banco  de  Mexico  1975-1985, Subdireccion  de Investigaciones
Economica,  Banco  de  Hexico,  October  1986.  The capital  stock  for  1986  and
1987  was obtained  by adding  net investment  from  the National  Accounts,
INEGI,  to  the previous  years'  capital  stock  figures.
The  U.S.  Real Interest  Rate.  Is the  ex-post  real  interest  rate
calculated  as the ratio  between  one  plus  the Federal  Funds  rate  and one
plus  the  U.S. producer  price inflation  rate. The source  was  IFS,  IM.- 28 -
Gross Fixed  Private  and Public  Sector  Investment. These  series
were obtained  from  National  Accounts,  INCI.
Implicit  Price  Deflators. Both  the implicit  price  deflator  for
investment  and  GDP  were obtained  from  the  National  Accounts,  IGCI.
Output-Capital  Ratio.  It is the ratio  of CDP  and capital  stock
lagged  one  year.  The  data  on  CDP  was obtained  from  National  Accounts,
INEGI.
The Real  Interest  Rate.  Is the  ex-post  real  interest  rate
calculated  as the ratio  between  one  plus the  nominal  interest  rate  and  one
plus  the  inflation  rate  in  the  implicit  CDP deflator.  The  nominal  interest
rate  is  a  weighted  average  of  after  tax  yields  of  banks  instruments.  The
source  was:  Gil  Diaz  F.,  lexlicot  Macroeconomic  Policies  Adjustments  and
Growth  in the  Long-Rung,  1988,  Table  A56.
The  Real  ExchanRe  Rate.  It is  a  trade-weighted  real  exchange
rate. World Bank  staff  estimates.
The Index  of Quantify  Restrictions  on Imports.  It  reflects  the
percentage  of imports  subject  to  quantity  restrictions  out  of total
imports.  The source  wass  Gil  Diaz  F.,  Ibidem.
The  Rate of  Net Domestic  Credit  Creation.  Net  domestic  credit  is
obtained  from  the  consolidated  banking  system  balance  sheet.  Its  rate  of
change  is  obtained  as the  annual  change  in  the  nominal  stock  of  net credit
divided  by  the  nominal  stock  of  monetary  assets  at  the  beginning  of  the
year.  The  source  was  IFS,  IMF,- 29 -
The  Relative  Price  of  US Capital  Goods  in  Mes$.  It is obtained  as
the  product  of the  US producer  price  index  for  capital  equipment  and  the
index  of the  annual  average  of the  controlled  exchange  rate,  divided  by the
GDP  deflator. The  source  for  both  components  of the  numerator  was IFS,
IMP.- 30  -
TABLE 3: MEXICO:  Data  Used  In  Estimating  the  Regressions
(In  Percent)
obs  p  pf  Y/K  QRs
1960  102.9630  154.1193  43.43353  37.80000
1961  99.28571  149.0040  42.73182  53.80000
1962  97.22222  145.2433  44.09813  52.50000
1963  101.3513  141.6858  48.76482  63.50000
1964  96.81529  134.9514  49.17985  65.50000
1965  104.3478  133.2900  49.13813  60.00000
1966  103.5928  131.7626  50.38022  62.00000
1967  104.6512  132.0489  50.48351  65.20000
1968  109.6591  133.6898  51.53908  64.40000
1969  108.7432  132.7428  51.08719  65.10000
1970  97.04434  125.2992  50.97790  68.31000
1971  93.95349  123.1190  51.74186  67.70000
1972  92.98246  118.9657  52.74241  66.30000
1973  91.86047  108.7214  53.39858  69.60000
1974  90.15873  101.6703  48.90191  82.00000
1975  93.13187  101.4508  47.96574  86.50000
1976  93.33333  111.7171  47.94003  90.40000
1977  99.64602  134.0266  43.19328  67.70000
1978  99.69698  124.9216  46.96928  64.20000
1979  102.2814  li3.7006  47.80382  60.00000
1980  100.0000  100.0000  47.38810  76.00000
1981  95.63492  93.44348  46.32153  82.80000
1982  104.8817  141.1739  41.34202  78.30000
1983  124.7540  162.4675  30.65258  80.19000
1984  116.5826  145.8740  32.50785  78.40000
1985  117.6855  145.6892  32.12053  35.10000
1986  119.8642  202.7307  28.49463  17.90000
1987  110.8495  189.9779  24.07883  13.60000- 31  -
TABLE 3:  MEXICO:  Data  Used  In  Estimating
the  Regressions
(In  Percent)
obs  r  rf  c  (M/K)  De
1960  1.731315  3.103034  NA  6.112343  NA
1961  3.718571  2.278718  8.333333  6.031656  -0.711747
1962  4.650061  2.476155  12.00000  6.954368  -1.523295
1963  5.354871  3.502887  10.34483  7.181367  0.636940
1964  2.480528  3.264979  8.823529  6.905303  -2.983721
1965  5.541052  2.042472  13.51351  7.118165  -0.745576
1966  4.396333  1.750047  7.317073  7.111777  2.253523
1967  5.398923  3.995866  -2.222222  6.519766  -2.571169
1968  6.101330  3.092682  6.666667  6.458S45  -0.848258
1969  4.632873  4.166810  32.65306  7.673700  0.950570
1970  -1.641672  3.420218  7.692308  7.355075  -1.506590
1971  2.677368  1.279894  2.816901  6.968513  0.000000
1972  1.951872  0.020779  25.00000  7.937831  3.250480
1973  -4.799815  -3.898387  28.57143  7.849524  -0.277781
1974  -11.80785  -7.001092  36.22047  8.180079  -2.228407
1975  -6.290481  -3.128493  24.13793  8.490438  -1.994308
1976  -9.473949  0.373911  19.26605  7.425216  4.941866
1977  -15.83482  -0.269532  129.5019  12.70240  10.71099
1978  -5.499469  0.139519  32.07907  13.28170  -4.920769
1979  -7.128217  -1.186579  35.16193  13.74147  -4.385965
1980  -6.897067  -0.673965  39.20993  13.20168  -8.256881
1981  -1.268714  6.643455  44.15266  13.12755  -9.300003
1982  -16.29402  10.04162  83.44542  9.974231  48.07057
19E3  -22.61354  7.735204  65.30278  8.678700  2.382723
1984  -14.30395  7.670287  64.34782  8.852296  -17.09091
1985  -1.410914  8.617634  56.74508  7.470602  -2.017547
1986  -0.254954  10.00894  95.04859  6.371425  30.61772
1987  -3.908425  3.884043  85.11198  6.456861  3.769706
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TABLE 3: MEXICO:  Data  Used  In  Estimating
the  Regressions
(In  Billions  of  1980  MexS)
obs  PRIV  k  PUI  a  m
1960  151.0791  2908.505  64.74820  44.44444  177.7778
1961  151.0792  2960.570  71.94245  35.71429  178.5714
1962  142.8572  2895.862  78.57143  41.66667  201.3889
1963  166.6667  3198.969  93.33334  54.05405  229.7297
1964  190.7894  3412.867  118.4211  50.95541  235.6688
1965  232.1429  3577.585  95.23810  43.47826  254.6584
1966  219.6532  3788.942  121.3873  47.90419  269.4611
1967  238.8889  4012.842  133.3333  52.32558  261.6279
1968  248.7047  4310.642  145.0777  56.81818  278.4091
1969  286.4322  4628.684  140.7035  54.64481  355.1913
1970  355.3300  4755.270  162.4365  54.18720  349.7537
1971  376.2376  5072.652  118.8119  65.11628  353.4884
1972  372.6415  5414.887  174.5283  74.56141  429.8246
1973  392.4051  6271.057  236.2869  69.76744  492.2481
1974  482.3944  6752.759  257.0423  60.31746  552.3810
1975  463.1268  7053.831  312.6844  57.69231  598.9011
1976  460.5911  8080.573  298.0296  50.57471  600.0000
1977  483.1262  8035.553  273.5346  -0.530972  1020.708
1978  530.3951  8630.012  316.1094  -8.333333  1146.212
1979  583.6431  9432.747  411.4003  -6.717368  1296.198
1980  727.0000  10499.42  487.0000  -42.89999  1386.100
1981  797.5102  11686.32  595.0208  -85.71429  1534.127
1982  580.6299  15103.02  474.3771  -295.3649  1506.410
1983  487.9618  14753.65  282.0673  -182.2890  1280.425
1984  524.8465  15316.92  292.1552  -81.20423  1355.899
1985  622.3652  16582.56  292.6184  -168.4484  1238.817
1986  487.5311  19905.28  240.4868  -214.6600  1268.250
1987  540.4833  19981.49  220.5079  235.8072  1290.177
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